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Abstract:  This paper proposes a method to decompose earnings inequality into a component 
due to unequal opportunities and a residual term. Drawing on the distinction between 
‘circumstance’ and ‘effort’ variables in John Roemer’s work on equality of opportunity, we 
associate inequality of opportunities with the inequality attributable to circumstances which lie 
beyond the control of the individual – such as her family background, her race and the region 
where she was born. We interpret the decomposition as establishing a lower bound on the 
contribution of opportunities to earnings inequality. We further decompose the effect of 
opportunities into a direct effect on earnings and an indirect component which works through the 
“effort” variables. The decomposition is applied to the distributions of male and female earnings 
in Brazil, in 1996. While the residual term is large, observed circumstances nevertheless account 
for around a quarter of the value of the Theil index. Parental education is by far the most 
important circumstance  affecting earnings, dwarfing the effects of race and place of birth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Income inequality has many sources, not all of which are equally objectionable. A reasonable 
distinction, which is often made informally, is that inequality in the opportunities available to 
people – their basic life chances, determined by factors such as their race or gender, the families 
they are born to or the countries they are born in, and perhaps even their endowments of natural 
talent – is more objectionable than inequalities which arise because of the differential application 
of individual effort.
1 John Roemer (1998) offered one formalization of the concept of unequal 
opportunities across different types of individuals, suggesting that one should separate the 
determinants of a person’s earnings into circumstance variables (those which are exogenous to 
the person) and effort variables (which she can influence). He suggested a precise definition of 
an equal-opportunity policy, which would be to equalize “advantage” (which one might 




Practical applications of this approach have remained scarce, however, and this is in part because 
the analysis becomes rather cumbersome as the number of “types” increases. In fact, although 
various other authors in the fields of ethics and social choice have recently argued that 
opportunity, rather than income or other observable outcomes, should become the “currency of 
egalitarian justice”,
3 empirical usage of the concept has remained rare. Basically, this is because 
economists do not know how to measure inequality of opportunity.  
 
This paper proposes a simple method to quantify the degree of inequality of opportunity 
associated with an empirical distribution of incomes or earnings. The basic approach is to divide 
all observed earnings determinants (available from a household or labor force survey, say) into 
those which can be regarded as exogenous to the individual, in the sense that they can not be 
influenced by her actions, and all others. Following Roemer, we refer to the first set of variables 
                                                 
1 One recent paper argued that “according to the opportunity egalitarian ethics, economic inequalities due to factors 
beyond the individual responsibility are inequitable and to be compensated by society, whereas inequalities due to 
personal responsibility are equitable and not to be compensated.” (Peragine, 2004, p.11). 
2 Roemer (1998, p.27) recognizes that there may be no single policy which does this for every centile, and proposes 
an averaging of  “indirect advantage functions” across centiles to generate a well-defined maximand.  
3 Notably Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and Dworkin (1981). Cohen argues that Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach is not too far removed from the concept of opportunities either.   3
– which could include sex, race, place of birth, family wealth, parental education, or family 
background more generally - as “circumstance” variables. Our approach is simply to simulate the 
reduction in earnings inequality which would attain if differences in circumstance variables were 
eliminated. This difference between observed and counterfactual inequality is interpreted as a 
lower bound for inequality of opportunities, for reasons which we discuss in below. Our main 
challenge is to take account of the fact that other earnings determinants – such as one’s own level 
of education or position in the labor market – are endogenous, since they are also influenced by 
those same circumstances, and to address the identification problems which this entails for the 
estimation of the relevant empirical model.  
 
We apply this approach to the distribution of hourly earnings in urban Brazil, separately for 
males and females, exploiting the fact that the 1996 Brazilian household survey includes 
information on parental education and occupation. Our results suggest that over a fifth, and for 
some cohorts almost a third, of observed earnings inequality can be attributed to a set of only 
four exogenous circumstance variables, namely race, place of birth, parental education and 
father’s occupation. To the extent that other circumstances – such as family wealth, primary 
school quality, etc – are uncorrelated with those determinants, these estimates should be seen as 
a lower bound on inequality of opportunity. We also divide the sample into seven age groups, 
and investigate the evolution of both the opportunity and the residual components of inequality 
across cohorts. We find some evidence of a moderate decline in the opportunity share of 
inequality. Finally, we investigate the relative importance of each individual circumstance 
variable separately, and find that parental education dwarfs all other circumstance variables, 
including race, in importance.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related empirical 
literature.  Section 3 describes our data set. Section 4 lays out our empirical approach and 
formally defines the decomposition of earnings inequality into a (lower bound) component 
attributable to unequal opportunities and a residual. Section 5 discusses our estimation strategy 
and the bounds analysis used for identification. Section 6 presents the estimation results, and 
Section 7 summarizes the results of the final decompositions. Section 8 briefly concludes. 
   4
2.   Empirical Approaches to Inequality of Opportunity: the literature. 
 
While we are not aware of other papers which seek to measure the share of earnings inequality 
attributable to unequal opportunities, there is a (small) empirical literature which aims to 
quantify the costs and effects of implementing Roemer’s “equal opportunity policy” in different 
contexts. Focusing on race and parental education as determinants of opportunities in the United 
States, Betts and Roemer (1999) ask what reallocation of educational expenditures would 
equalize opportunities across four types of individuals in the US (using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men). Interestingly, they find that race is a more important 
partitioning variable than parental education in their sample. In a related study, Page and Roemer 
(2001) ask to what extent the United States fiscal system can be seen as an “opportunity 
equalizing device”. These authors also focus on race and parental education (which they interpret 
as a proxy for socioeconomic background) as the key circumstance variables, and find that the 
US tax system does contribute to an equalization of opportunities (as compared to the pre-tax 
earnings distribution) across socio-economic groups, but much less so across racial groups.
4  
 
These studies differ from ours in two ways: first, they seek to assess specific (actual or 
counterfactual) policies with respect to their opportunity-equalizing impact, whereas we ask what 
share of observed overall inequality is due to unequal opportunities. Second, by virtue of 
Roemer’s definition of an equal-opportunity policy, they are restricted to differences across a 
few (usually four) large groups, determined by a very limited set of circumstances. As we will 
see, our decomposition allows for a broader treatment of circumstances. 
 
Given the importance of family background (and, more specifically, parental education) as a key 
circumstance variable, this paper is also related to the much larger empirical literature on 
intergenerational mobility. This literature has a long and distinguished tradition, dating back at 
least to Bowles (1972), and Behrman and Taubman (1976). Much of it focuses on the 
intergenerational elasticity of some measure of economic status, estimated as the coefficient β in 
the Galtonian regression:  ε β α + + = −1 ln ln y y , where y denotes the measure of economic 
                                                 
4 A larger group of authors have extended this analysis of fiscal systems as opportunity-equalizers to other countries 
in Roemer et. al. (forthcoming).   5
status of interest, and y-1 measures the same variable for a person’s parent(s). This elasticity 
measures the degree of transmission of economic status across generations, and is thus 
interpreted as a measure of persistence of its inequality. Its complement, 1- β, is often interpreted 
as a measure of intergenerational mobility.
5  
 
A variety of economic status variables have been used, including wages (from the PSID and the 
NLS data sets for the US, as well as for a number of European countries); total earnings; family 
income; family wealth; family consumption; and years of schooling. Results obviously vary by 
indicator and by country.  Two excellent recent surveys of this literature exist, in Solon (1999) 
and Mulligan (1999), and we do not replicate their work here.
6  
 
Two recent papers have estimated such Galtonian regressions for Brazil, using exactly the same 
data set as we use in this paper. Dunn (2003) considers only males aged 25-34, and instruments 
for father’s earnings using father’s education. He finds an elasticity of 0.69, “higher than in any 
country previously studied” (Dunn, 2003, p.1).
7 Sérgio Ferreira and Veloso (2004) also estimate 
Brazilian intergenerational elasticities for various cohorts, using parental occupation and 
education as instruments, but their procedure involves first estimating “parent” earnings 
equations on earlier PNAD samples, and then using the estimated coefficients to predict earnings 
for the parents of the workers in the 1996 sample.
8 For the middle cohorts (i.e. excluding the 
oldest and the youngest cohorts) they find intergenerational elasticities in the 0.50-0.68 range. 
 
                                                 
5 Behrman and Taubman (1976) took a different route. They used information on white male twins to estimate the 
contribution of a genetic component (and of two separate environment components) to the variance in four different 
measures of adult individual achievement. 
6 It is worth noting, though, that since those surveys were published, some recent findings for the United States have 
challenged the 1990s consensus that the intergenerational elasticity of earnings in that country was of the order of 
0.4 (see, e.g. Solon, 1992). Although this figure was already seen as indicating lower intergenerational mobility than 
previously thought, more recent analysis suggests an even higher elasticity – and hence lower mobility. Much of the 
variation hinges on how one averages out transitory components and measurement errors associated with earnings 
observations at a single point in time. While Solon (1992) already used an average of earnings across periods, 
Mazumder (2005) uses longer earnings histories, and estimates an elasticity of closer to 0.6. See also Bowles and 
Gintis (2002). 
7 Although he acknowledges that “If fathers’ educations are independently positively correlated with sons’ earnings, 
then the IV elasticity estimate will be upwards-inconsistent.”(p.5). He correctly treats his estimate as an upper-
bound.  
8 Their approach is essentially a two-sample instrumental variable procedure. See Angrist and Krueger (1992).   6
While these papers are related and complementary to our study, they have different objectives. 
They seek to understand intergenerational mobility in one specific economic indicator, in this 
case earnings. We are interested in quantifying the share of current earnings inequality which is 
attributable to inequality of opportunities, using Roemer’s concept of circumstance variables. 
The point of contact between the two approaches is that parental education (and occupation) are 
important circumstances, and account for a substantial share of current inequality. But we also 
consider other circumstances observed in the data set, chiefly race and region of birth, and 
quantify their importance. We further identify two separate channels for the impact of parental 
education (and other circumstances) on current earnings: a direct impact and an indirect effect 
through the child’s own schooling, migration decisions, and insertion in the labor market. This is 
clearly not possible when, as in Dunn (2003), parental education is used as an instrument for 
parental earnings. The two approaches are ultimately best seen as complements, rather than as 
substitutes. 
 
Another branch of the intergenerational mobility literature has focused directly on educational 
transmission. Some papers estimate the part of schooling inequality which is explained by the 
characteristics of parents, which they take to quantify the inequality of opportunities, whereas the 
remainder is attributed to heterogeneous individual efforts. This approach has been followed by 
Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) for Latin American countries. Barros and Lam (1993), 
and Lam (1999) applied similar methods to Brazil. Given the nature of their data sets, however, 
those studies focused on expected future mobility or, in other words, the relation between the 
potential earnings of children when they become adults, and the earnings of their parents. The 
approach was not suitable for disentangling the actual share of the inequality of opportunity in 
today’s level of overall (outcome) inequality.  
 
3. The  Data 
 
Our data comes from the 1996 wave of the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios 
(PNAD – National Household Survey), which is conducted annually by the Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatítica (IBGE), Brazil’s Census Bureau.
9 The survey is nationally 
                                                 
9 The PNAD is an annual survey, but is not fielded on Census years.   7
representative, except for the rural areas of the Northern Region. This exception does not affect 
our analysis, which is restricted to urban areas because of the general imprecision of earnings 
and income measurement in rural areas.
10 The sample is also restricted to individuals 26 to 60 
years old, in an effort to concentrate on individuals who had finished schooling and were active 
in the labor market. We study the 1996 survey because, on that year, information is available on 
the education and occupation of the parents of all surveyed household heads and spouses.
11 The 
complete PNAD 1996 sample size is upwards of 330,000 individuals. After excluding 
individuals living in rural areas; those outside the 26-60 age range; those who are not household 
heads or their spouses; and those with missing entries for the relevant variables, we are left with 
a sample of 48,392 active adults. We further excluded 179 adults who reported being non-
remunerated workers in family enterprises.
12  
 
This sample was then divided into seven 5-year birth cohorts - from individuals born between 
1936-40 up to those born between 1966-70. This allows us not only to measure the role of the 
inequality of opportunities in shaping the inequality of observed earnings at a point in time, but 
also to study how this role may vary across cohorts. An important question is indeed whether the 
increase in the educational level of successive cohorts was accompanied by more or less 
inequality of opportunities, or whether it corresponded to a uniform upward shift in schooling 
achievements, with constant inequality of opportunities.  Comparing various cohorts observed at 
a single point in time allows us to shed some light on this issue.  
 
Our key dependent variable is current individual earnings, measured as “real hourly earnings 
from all occupations”. Other variables used in the analysis include a race dummy variable, 
parental education expressed as the number of years of schooling 
13, the occupational position of 
                                                 
10 See Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2003) for a discussion of the shortcomings of the rural income data in the PNAD. 
11  This information is not generally collected in the PNAD, but was also available in both the 1982 and the 1988 
surveys. Earnings in the 1982 survey were collected with respect to a different reference period (of three months) 
and are therefore not comparable with other years.  The 1988 survey was used to check the robustness of some of 
the results reported in this paper.  
12 To control for the effect of the productivity of these workers on the reported earnings of their household heads, we 
included a dummy variable for the latter in the earnings equation discussed in the next section. The coefficient on 
this dummy variable was statistically insignificant, and it was subsequently dropped. 
13 Parental education is given in discrete levels. They were converted into years of schooling (here in brackets) 
using the following rule.  No school or incomplete 1st grade (0); incomplete elementary  (2); complete elementary, 
or complete 4
th grade (4); incomplete 1
st cycle of secondary or 5
th to 7
th grade  (6); complete 1
st cycle of secondary or   8
the father
14 - a 9-level categorical variable-  and dummies for the regions of origin.  We also use 
the individual’s own schooling attainment, measured in years
15; years of schooling squared, to 
capture possible non-linearities, and a migration dummy, defined as whether the observed 
municipality of residence is different from the one where the individual was born. Finally, a 
categorical variable for labor market status is included, which indicates whether the worker is a 
formal employee (“com carteira”); an informal employee (“sem carteira”); self-employed (“conta 
própria”); or an employer. Descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in Table 1.  
 
4. The  Decomposition 
 
We are interested in estimating the share of observed inequality in current earnings which can be 
attributed to inequality of opportunity. Loosely following John Roemer, we associate opportunity 
with the impact on earnings of variables which are completely independent from individual 
effort, and which we call “circumstances”. Our main goal is to estimate the reduction in 
inequality which would attain if there were no differences in people’s circumstances. It is this 
reduction which we will take to measure the contribution of inequality in opportunity to 
observed earnings inequality.  
 
We will also follow Roemer in calling the other variables which help determine earnings – i.e. 
those which affect earnings but can be affected by individual decisions – as “efforts”. We will 
keep inverted commas on that term throughout, however, to acknowledge that – besides being 
explicitly influenced by observed circumstances - they may also capture the effects of 
unobserved circumstances with which they are correlated.  Denoting earnings by w, circumstance 
variables by the vector C; “effort” variables by the vector E; and other, unobserved determinants 
by u, one can write the earnings function most generally as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
complete 8
th grade  (8); incomplete 2
nd cycle (9.5); complete 2
nd cycle of secondary  (11); incomplete superior (13); 
complete superior (15); master or doctorate (17). 
14 The 9-level occupational categories are: rural workers (1); domestic servants (2); traditional sector workers (3); 
service sector workers (4); modern industry workers (5); self-employed shopkeepers (6); technicians, artists and 
desk workers (7); employers (8); liberal professionals (9). This classification is borrowed from Brazilian 
sociological studies on occupational mobility (see Pero, 2001; Valle e Silva, 1978) 
15 The number of years of schooling directly provided in the PNAD is bounded at 15.  For consistency with the scale 
used for parents' schooling, this variable was changed to 17 for individuals reporting  a “master or doctorate” degree. 
The distinction between these two levels is not made in the data and, although a doctorate is likely to take at least 20 
years to complete, a Masters degree is likely to be more common. In any case, this affects less than 1% of the 
sample.   9
wi = f(Ci, Ei, ui)           ( 1 )  
 
Noting that circumstance variables are exogenous by definition, but that “effort” variables can be 
affected by circumstances, as well as by unobserved determinants, implies that : 
 
wi = f(Ci, Ei (Ci, vi), ui)          ( 2 )  
 
For the purposes of empirical estimation, we could log-linearize (2) to obtain a system : 
 
Ln(wi) =  Ci.α + Ei.β + ui    ,        i i C u ⊥         ( 3 )  
Ei = BCi + vi  ,  i i C v ⊥         ( 4 )  
 
where wi denotes current hourly earnings, α and β are two vectors of coefficients and ui is an 
i.i.d. random variable with zero mean, that accounts for unobserved circumstance and effort 
variables; sheer luck; and measurement error. If one wished to interpret current wages, wi, as a 
proxy for permanent income or ‘economic status’, then ui would also include transitory income 
shocks. B is a matrix of coefficients linking the circumstance variables to the “effort” variables. 
This matrix explicitly allows for the fact that some of these “effort” variables are clearly affected 
by circumstances. Formal schooling, for example, is determined at least in part by family 
background. This effect of parental background on the educational outcomes of the next 
generation may occur because more educated parents provide more “home inputs” into an 
“education production function”, such as books, vocabulary and quality time spent on 
homework, but it may also reflect individual learning about the returns to effort, which may 
themselves depend on the circumstances – and indeed on the previous mobility history – of the 
family.
16  vi is another white-noise disturbance term, orthogonal to the vector C, as indicated.
17 
                                                 
16 Hanushek (1986) reviews the literature on the first, ‘production function’ view of the impact of family 
characteristics on individual schooling outcomes. Piketty (1995) models the second type of channel, where 
individual beliefs about opportunities and mobility are formed on the basis of the experience of their own lineages, 
and in turn rationally determine their own effort levels. Our empirical model allows for both types of indirect effects 
of circumstances (and past history) on earnings through efforts.  
17 One could substitute (4) into (3) and obtain an even more reduced-form equation, Ln(wi) =  Ci.(α + β.B) + vi β +  
ui . While running our main decomposition on the basis of this specification is both possible and econometrically 
simpler, it would not then be possible to distinguish the direct (α) from the indirect (βB) effect of circumstances on 
earnings inequality, as we do.   10
 
If the system (3)-(4) could be sensibly estimated (which will be discussed in the next section), 
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= Θ         ( 5 )  
 
Where I(w) is a particular inequality index defined over earnings, and C  is a constant vector, the 
elements of which could, for instance, take the value of the cross-sectional sample mean of each 
element of the vector of circumstances. In practical terms, ΘI can be estimated by simulating a 
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where B ˆ , α ˆ  and β ˆ  are the estimates obtained for the parameters in (3) and (4) – in a manner 
which will soon be described – and u ˆ i and v ˆ i are the estimation residuals for each individual. 
 
One can further decompose the contribution of opportunities to observed inequality into a direct 
and an indirect effect. Define the direct effect as: 
  () () [] ( ) ()
1 :
− − = Θ w I w I w I
p d
I ,   where  ( ) i i
p
i u E C w Ln ˆ ˆ ˆ + + = β α      ( 7 )  




I Θ − Θ = Θ . According to this definition, the direct 
effect of opportunities on earnings is the impact of circumstance variables controlling for 
“effort” variables, but ignoring any effect through the latter. The indirect effect is the effect of 
circumstances on earnings through observed “efforts”.  
 
Before discussing the estimation of (3)-(4), we should acknowledge that this system of 
equations, like any parametric model, is somewhat restrictive. It relies on certain functional form 
assumptions, which will be described in more detail below. Additionally, to simplify the micro-
simulation procedures used to generate the counterfactual earnings distributions {w ~} and {
p w }, 
we have chosen to be parsimonious in our specification, and have omitted various possible 
interaction terms between circumstance and effort variables in (3). This is not entirely innocuous,   11
in that it restricts returns to “effort” variables, such as schooling, not to vary with circumstances. 
This may be an unrealistic assumption which it would be interesting to test, but that remains for 
further research. 
 
5. Estimation  Strategy 
 
To carry out the decompositions proposed in (5) and (7), one needs to obtain meaningful 
estimates for the parameters in the system (3) – (4). Based on the information available in the 
PNAD 1996 data set, we observe four basic circumstance variables: race (R), parental schooling 
(represented as mean parental schooling, MPE, and the difference between the mother’s and the 
father’s schooling, DPE), region of birth (GR) and father’s occupational status (FO). So C = (R, 
GR, MPE, DPE, FO). Our “effort” variables are years of schooling (S), years of schooling 
squared (S
2), a migration dummy (M) and labor market status (L). These variables were 
described in Section 3. The model (3)-(4) can thus be rewritten as: 
 
i L i M i S i S i F i D i P i G i R i i u L M S S FO DPE MPE GR R w Ln + + + + + + + + + + = β β β β α α α α α α . . . . . . . ) ( 2
2
0          (8) 
i F i D i P i G i R i i v b FO b DPE b MPE b GR b R b S + + + + + + = . . . . 0                 (9) 
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Equation (8) is simply the linear earnings equation (3) written out in full. Equations (9), (10) and 
(11) now replace equation (4). (9) is a linear schooling equation which, since it includes parental 
education on the right-hand side, could be seen as an extended Galtonian equation in years of 
schooling. Although (4) was written as a linear system, our two remaining “effort” variables
18 
are discrete, and are thus estimated by a probit model (for migration, through equation 10, where 
                                                 
18 No separate equation is estimated for S
2, given the similarity with the linear schooling variable.   12
ξ is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero) and by a multinomial logit model for 
selection of labor market status (11).
19  
 
As before, we assume that u is orthogonal to C. In a sense, we are therefore effectively treating 
as exogenous circumstances not only parental education, say, but also the components of 
unobserved determinants which are correlated with it, such as parental wealth or 
intergenerationally correlated ability.
20 To the extent that these unobserved correlates of the 
exogenous variables in C are themselves also exogenous circumstances which affect earnings, 
we do in fact want to capture them in our decomposition, and they ‘belong’ in C. The overall 
impact of circumstances, thus redefined, will be truthfully described by the estimates of α. In 
other words, if parental wealth or income is not observed, the estimate of α will account for both 
the effect on children’s earnings of the variables in C and the effect of that part of parental 
wealth or income which is correlated with elements of C. 
 
The real problem arises because unobservables (u) in the earnings equation cannot be assumed to 
be independent of the “effort” variables (E). Again, imagine that parental wealth has a direct 
impact on either the schooling or the current earnings of their children (or both), independently 
of the child’s own education. This correlation between u and E, or u and v, introduces bias in the 
estimation of the (α,β) coefficients and therefore in the decomposition of the total inequality into 
circumstance and effort components. Similar arguments apply if u is not independent from ξ or 
ε, in (10) or (11). 
 
One way out of this difficulty would be to observe instrumental variables, Z that would influence 
efforts but not earnings. Equation (4) would then be replaced by:  
 
                                                 
19 The assumptions underlying the use of the multinomial logit are that occupational choice across the different 
employment alternatives can be modeled using a linear utility function of the circumstance variables, with 
unobserved determinants (ε) which follow a Weibull distribution. See McFadden (1974). 
20 There is a recent literature that has tried to disentangle the “true” effect of some of the observed circumstance 
variables included here, such as family background. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), for instance, have pointed out 
that the impact of women’s schooling on children’s schooling may be overstated because of intergenerationally 
correlated genetic ability and motivation endowments.  For our purposes, however, we want to include these latter 
influences along with the narrowly defined effect of mother’s schooling, as a broader measure of family 
circumstances.   13
Ei  = BCi + DZi + vi                         ( 1 2 )  
 
with the vector Zi being orthogonal to both ui and vi. Then instrumenting the effort variables in 
(3) through (12) would yield an unbiased estimator of (α,β) and then an unbiased decomposition 
of total inequality into inequality of observed opportunities, or circumstances, and inequality of 
efforts. Instruments have, of course, been extensively used in the literature on returns to 
education. In the standard Mincerian equation, for instance, instrumenting education with family 
background has been often used to correct for the endogeneity of education. But if family 
background is an independent determinant of earnings in its own right, and indeed one is 
interested in separating out the impacts of the instrument and of the variable it is instrumenting 
for, as is presently the case, then some other instrument is required. Ability tests taken while 
attending school have also been used. But ability may also belong in the earnings equation and, 
besides, that information is seldom available in developing countries. Other popular instruments 
include distance to school or, equivalently, the density of the school network in the respondent’s 
vicinity. This would have been obtainable for Brazil, but it is likely to be correlated with other 
omitted earnings determinants, such as city size. Also, school distance might not have been an 
appropriate instrument for other variables in E, such as migration or labor market status.
21 
 
In the absence of an adequate set of instrumental variables Z, the only solution is to explore the 
likely sign and magnitude of the potential bias in the estimation of α and β due to the correlation 
between u and v, and then to decide, on that basis, what is the most reasonable range of 
estimates. This is the approach we adopt in this paper, relying on the following parametric 
bounds analysis. 
 
Let X = (C, E) = (R, GR, MPE, DPE, FO; S, S
2, M, L) and  ( )' ,β α γ = , so that we can rewrite (3) 
or (8) as:   
i i i u X Lnw + = γ            ( 3 ’ )  
                                                 
21 Early contributions to the literature on estimating returns to schooling include Bowles (1972) and Griliches and 
Mason (1972). For an excellent survey of more recent empirical estimates, using instruments based on institutional 
features of the supply side of the education system, see Card (2001).   14
In (3’), as in (3),  i u  is not necessarily orthogonal to all explanatory variables in X. Assume 
without loss of generality that all the variables have zero mean and define the following 
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   and     X X S ' =  
 
The bias of OLS estimates of equation (3’) is given by B in (13):  
u X Xu S u X S  B B E σ σ ρ γ γ ) ( ' with  ) ˆ (
1 1 ⊗ = = + =
− −       ( 1 3 )  
 
where  Xu ρ  stands for the correlation coefficients between the components of X and the residual 
term, u, and σV is the standard error of variable V. Evaluating the bias vector B thus requires 
knowing σu and  Xu ρ .  An unbiased estimator of  σu is readily obtained for any set of correlation 
coefficients  Xu ρ . Indeed, it can be shown that  SB B u u ' ˆ
2 2 + =σ σ   where 
2 ˆu σ is the variance of the 
OLS residuals. Substituting the value of the bias given in (13) in that expression yields:  
) 1 /( ˆ
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with K given by: 
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1
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For any set of correlation coefficients  Xu ρ , equations (13)-(15) would permit computing the 
bias vector B and thus obtaining unbiased estimates of the variance of the error term and of the 
coefficients of the model, γ. Since these correlation coefficients are not known, we explore the 
set of possible values for the bias by randomly generating a large number of correlation 
coefficients, and checking for consistency with a set of conditions which must hold for them to 
be valid. We first randomly draw 1000 values for  Su ρ , u S2 ρ , Mu ρ and Lu ρ , each from a 
uniform distribution defined on (-1, 1). Since the correlation coefficient vector  Xu ρ must satisfy 
the condition that the covariance matrix Σ be positive semi-definite, all drawings such that this 
condition is not satisfied are deleted. Four additional assumptions are imposed on the signs of 
coefficient estimates γˆ, as in modern bounds analysis (see, for instance, Manski and Pepper,   15
2000): the coefficients on the race dummy for Afro-Brazilians, on the regional dummy for the 
Northeast and on the labor market status dummy for informal employees were constrained to be 
non-positive; the coefficients on own schooling and on the labor market status dummy for 
employers were constrained to be non-negative. Each of these assumptions is backed up by an 
extensive body of earnings regressions for Brazil; see various chapters in Henriques (2000). 




The surviving values of the randomly generated correlation coefficients are substituted into (15) 
and (13), to generate a distribution of values for each element of the bias vector, B. We then use 
the corresponding distribution of estimates of coefficients  ( )' ˆ , ˆ ˆ β α γ =  to generate a series of 
counterfactual earnings distributions { } w ~ , through equation (6), and { }
p w , through equation 
(7).
23 Inequality indices – Theil indices and Gini coefficients - are then computed over each of 
those distributions. Finally, in Section 7, we report the decompositions described in (5) and (7) 
for the mean, the highest, and the lowest values in the set of these inequality measures, for each 
cohort/gender combination.  
 
6. Estimation  Results 
 
Earnings equations (8) were estimated separately for men and women, and by cohort, using OLS 
for men and a two-stage selection bias correction procedure for women. Table 2a reports the 
equation for males; Table 2b reports the second stage equation for women, and Table 2c reports 
                                                 
22 Bounds analysis of this kind is not used as commonly to address identification issues as one might expect, because 
it usually leads to rather large bounds around coefficient estimates, considerably reducing their usefulness for 
hypothesis testing. For the purposes of our decomposition, however, the bounds that matter are those around the 
inequality measure defined over a distribution of counterfactual earnings predicted using the estimated coefficients 
(rather than around the coefficients themselves). For this application, the bounds are acceptably narrow, and this 
kind of analysis is probably preferable to the use of instruments of questionable validity. 
23 The second line of equation (6) implies that circumstance variables are equalized in (9), (10) and (11), to predict 
counterfactual schooling levels, migration decisions and labor status categories. This is straight forward for the 
linear schooling equation (9). For simulating with the probit model (10) and the multinomial logit (11), one does not 
observe actual residuals, so that pseudo-residuals must be simulated in a way which is consistent with the observed 
choices in the actual distribution. An easy way to do this is to draw the residuals randomly in the law of extreme 
values, discarding drawings which are inconsistent with observed choices. The operation is repeated until a single 
set of values is drawn such that the migration and occupational choices are in accordance with the ones actually 
observed. See Bourguignon et al. (2004) for a detailed explanation of the methodology.   16
the first-stage equation for women. For each entry in Tables 2a and 2b, we first report our 
estimate of the unbiased coefficient, obtained by correcting the OLS estimate with our mean 
estimate for its bias, as described in Section 5. Below this number, we report the unadjusted OLS 
coefficient and its standard error, for comparison. Apart from the oldest female age-group, biases 
turn out to have been quite small, so that the general discussion below largely refers to these 
coefficients interchangeably. In the equation for females, family composition variables, the 
number of children and household log income per capita – excluding own earnings – were used 
as instrumental variables in the first stage. A similar Heckman correction procedure was initially 
applied to men as well, but available instruments proved unsatisfactory. Unlike in the standard 
Mincer specification, age or imputed experience do not appear among the regressors because we 
treat cohorts as age-homogeneous by definition. 
 
Circumstance variables have the expected effect on earnings. The coefficients of racial dummy 
variables are negative and significant for both blacks and ‘pardos’.
24 They are generally positive, 
but not always significant for people with an Asian origin. The racial gap against blacks and 
'pardos' is much less pronounced for women and in fact it is generally insignificant. Regional 
differences are important, too. With the South-East as a reference, being born in the North-East 
has a strong and significantly negative effect for both men and women. The effect of the other 
regions is generally also negative, but seldom significant.
25  The estimated effect of mean 
parental education on individual earnings is always positive and highly significant. It tends to be 
somewhat higher for women than for men, and in both cases tends to decline from the older to 
the younger cohorts. It is also sizable, since it amounts to a 3 to 6 per cent increase in earnings, 
for each additional year of schooling of the parents.  
 
The difference between the education of the mother and the father is meant to detect a possible 
asymmetry in the role of the two parents. But no such asymmetry seems to be systematically 
present. The estimated effect of the father’s occupation on earnings, which we do not report on 
the tables due to space constraints, is generally positive when compared to the reference category 
                                                 
24 Race is self-reported in the PNAD: the respondent, rather than the interviewer, chooses his or her race. ‘Pardo’ is 
meant to refer to people of mixed-race, generally involving some Afro-Brazilian component. 
25 Except for the South region, for men.   17
of rural workers, but seldom significant. Significance tends to increase for the younger cohorts, 
but this seems to be driven by sample size differences, rather than changes in the coefficients.
26  
 
Turning now to the vector of “effort” variables, own education has the usual positive and 
significant effect on earnings for men. This effect is decreasing as one considers younger male 
cohorts. This is consistent with the negative coefficient generally found for the squared imputed 
experience term –i.e. age minus number of years of schooling minus first schooling age - in the 
standard Mincerian specification. This implies that returns to schooling increase with age, which 
is exactly what is found here.
27  The overall effect of education for women is insignificant at very 
low levels of schooling, but picks up at higher level of education. This is captured by the 
coefficient on the quadratic term, which is positive and significant for both genders, indicating  
that the marginal returns to education in Brazil increase with the number of years of schooling.  
 
The magnitude of the estimates for the returns to schooling in these equations is somewhat lower 
than previous estimates for Brazil. For instance, Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999) found that 
the marginal returns to a year of schooling lay in the range of 12 to 15 percent, for both men and 
women in 1999. In Table 2, marginal returns at 5 years of schooling range from 7 to 11 percent 
for men and from 11 to 13 percent at 10 years of schooling. This difference is most likely due to 
the inclusion of the family background variables, notably mean parental education. This 
resonates with earlier findings by Lam and Schoeni (1993), who also found that returns on own 
schooling decline when parental schooling is introduced in the regression. Lam and Schoeni 
(1993) interpret this finding as indicating a correlation between parental schooling and 
unobserved characteristics of workers, which are also correlated with their own schooling. We 
interpret the coefficient on parental schooling as capturing the effects of family background on 
current earnings which do not go through an individual’s own education, migration decisions, or 
labor market status. They may include intergenerationally correlated ability, as proposed by 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), which we also treat as a circumstance that can contribute to 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, we observe that all father’s occupational categories are highly significant determinants of 
individuals’ years of schooling in our effort equations described further on.  
27 The conventional Mincerian specification is such that: Lnw = a.S + b.Exp – c.Exp² where Exp = Age – S – 6. 
Expanding the Exp term leads to: Lnw = (a-b-12c).S + 2cAge.S - c.S
2 + terms in Age or Age squared. If this 
equation is estimated within groups with constant age, one should indeed observe that the coefficient of S is higher 
in older cohorts. Note that the present specification also includes an independent S
2 term.     18
unequal opportunities. It may include the effect of family wealth on the quality of the school 
attended by the child, an effect which will be present both on the school quantity equation and on 
the earnings equation, controlling for number of years. It may capture the effect of the parents’ 
social network in finding their child a high-paying job, and so on. A moment’s reflection will 
suggest that our interpretation is not inconsistent with Lam and Schoeni’s, and is also adequate 
to the decomposition we propose. 
 
Migration has a positive effect on earnings for both men and women, although it is more often 
significant for men. This sign could be consistent with a human capital interpretation of 
migration. The coefficient is rather large, amounting to a 10-20 per cent increase in earnings for 
males. While migration decisions taken as an adult are consistent with the “effort” classification, 
the definition of the variable in the data does not allow us to separate adult migrants from those 
who migrated as children, reflecting a parental decision. In the latter case, this variable might be 
better classified as a circumstance variable. This ambiguity in the (circumstance versus “effort”) 
status of the migration variable – which is of course also applicable to years to schooling, since 
early enrollment decisions are probably taken by one’s parents – is part of the reason why we 
must interpret the unequal opportunities component of our decomposition as a lower bound on 
the contribution of inequality of opportunities to earnings inequality in urban Brazil. 
 
The labor market status variable confirms one’s expectations: employers earn significantly more 
than formal employees, given these controls, and everyone else earns less (with the exception of 
self-employed women, for whom there is no significant difference with respect to formal 
employees). 
 
“Effort” equations: schooling, migration and position in the labor market 
 
We now briefly report on estimates for equations (9)-(11), and consider the impact of 
circumstances on our “effort” variables, namely own schooling; migration status and position in 
the labor market. The results for the linear schooling regressions are shown in Tables 3a and 3b 
separately for men and women.  They call for several remarks. 
   19
The first set of remarks has to do with intergenerational educational mobility as measured, 
inversely, by the coefficient of parental education, αP. This is an education analogue to the 
intergenerational elasticity of earnings discussed in Section 2. It would be natural to expect this   
educational persistence coefficient to lie in the (0, 1) interval, with zero suggesting complete 
independence between the schooling levels across generations, and one indicating that parental 
education fully determines schooling in the next generation, up to an average increase given by 
the constant term in the regression, and subject to a random term. Table 3 reveals rather high, but 
declining coefficients: educational persistence falls from 0.74 for the oldest generation to 0.5 for 
the youngest among men, and from 0.82 to 0.48 among women. Rising average levels of 
schooling across generations are picked up by the large constant terms. The fact that these 
estimates also rise across cohorts indicate an acceleration in schooling differentials across 
generations, for these age groups. 
 
Father’s occupation, race and region of birth are also significant determinants of education, even 
after controlling for parental schooling, and one another. Unlike for parental education, 
coefficients for these other circumstance variables do not display a clear declining trend across 
cohorts. Afro-Brazilians seem to have roughly the same absolute disadvantage in years of 
schooling in the cohort born in the 1960s - 1 to 1.5 years of schooling - as they have in the 
cohorts born in the 1930s or 1940s. Likewise, the disadvantage of being born in the North-East 
for men displays no clear trend. In effect, only the coefficient reflecting the disadvantage of 
being born from parents with a low level of schooling seems to have been clearly and steadily 
falling across cohorts.  In other words, the conditional distribution of educational opportunities 




An interesting feature of intergenerational educational mobility is that intra-household decision 
mechanisms seem to matter more for the education of daughters than for sons. The transmission 
of education from parents to girls is higher, the greater the mother’s schooling relative to the 
                                                 
28 There are some interesting changes in the coefficients for specific father’s occupational dummies for women: the 
advantage of women whose fathers were employers or domestic servants, with respect to those whose fathers were 
rural workers has increased substantially. Conversely, those women whose fathers were “liberal professionals” 
(white-collar workers), have seen their educational advantage over the daughters of rural workers decline across 
cohorts.   20
father’s. This effect is significant and persistent across cohorts. For boys, however, although the 
mother’s education still seems to weigh more than the father’s, the difference is only significant 
at the 5% level for a single cohort. In both cases, it is difficult to find a trend in the evolution 
across cohorts. 
 
This discussion of inequality of educational opportunities has been based on measuring 
education in terms of the number of years of schooling. One might well prefer a more 
sophisticated proxy for ‘human capital’ - such as the cost of education, including forgone 
earnings, or possibly the earnings that a given schooling level actually commands - rather than 
unadjusted years of schooling.  One problem with simple years of schooling is that the quality of 
the education received is not captured. It cannot be ruled out that taking into account the quality 
of education might modify the preceding conclusion of an increasing educational mobility in 
Brazil. Unfortunately, we know of no data source in Brazil which would allow us to combine 
information on plausible measures of educational quality with information on the schooling of 
parents, for individuals currently active in the labor market.
29 
 
We now turn to the effect of circumstance variables on the probability of migration, as estimated 
by the probit model in (10). Marginal effects calculated from the probits are shown for men and 
for women in Tables 4a and 4b. As is well-known, and as the constant terms confirm, migration 
was much less common for the later cohorts than it had been for those born in the late 30s and 
40s. Those born to fathers working in rural areas were likelier to migrate, and all the more so if 
they were born in the Northeast. For younger cohorts, migrants from the South and Center West 
also became more common. Afro-Brazilians and those with more educated parents are somewhat 
less likely to migrate, but neither race nor parental education were often significant. 
 
Tables 5a and 5b present the estimated marginal effects derived from the coefficients from the 
labor market status multinomial logit model in (11). The results suggest that both men and 
women with more educated parents are likelier to be employers or formal sector employees, and 
                                                 
29 Behrman and  Birdsall (1983) attempted to control for quality of schooling in earnings functions in Brazil, by 
linking data on individuals aged 15-35 years old with observations on the average schooling of teachers in the area 
where they had obtained their schooling. In our case, a similar analysis would not be plausible, since we cover a 
much larger time interval (seven cohorts with their corresponding parents), and do not know where most of the 
sampled individuals actually went to school.   21
less likely to be informal sector employees (‘sem carteira’). Parental education was not a 
significant influence on the probability of being self-employed, vis-à-vis being a formal sector 
employee, which may be a reflection of the greater heterogeneity of the self-employed sector. 
Having parents who worked as domestic servants seems to increase the probability that one is 
self-employed (particularly for men). Afro-Brazilians seem to be generally more likely to work 
in the informal sector, and less likely to employ others. Self-employment is relatively more 
common in the North-East, relative to formal employment. All in all, it seems that this basic set 
of circumstances can indeed have a significant impact on the nature of one’s insertion in the 
labor market in urban Brazil.  
 
7.   Decomposition Results.  
 
Using the coefficient estimates for equations (8)-(11), we simulate the counterfactual 
distributions {} w ~ , from equation (6), and { }
p w  from equation (7). This allows us to decompose 
earnings inequality for each gender/cohort combination in our sample, into a component due to 
unequal opportunities, and a residual component due to unobserved circumstances, “efforts”, and 
random elements such as transitory earnings or measurement error. The bounds analysis 
described in Section 5 was used to estimate a distribution of coefficient estimates that would give 
us a sense of the upper and lower limits for the biases. Using this distribution of coefficient 
estimates resulting from the bounds analysis, we computed counterfactual distributions and 
decompositions, over which inequality indices were calculated. The mean value, as well as the 
upper and lower bounds of inequality indices are presented in Table 6, for men, and in Table 7, 
for women. 
 
Each of these tables presents Theil coefficients for factual and counterfactual earnings 
distributions for our seven cohorts in 1996. The first row contains the observed inequality. The 
next panel, with four rows, presents inequality in the counterfactual distribution {} w ~ , where the 
inequality of opportunities due to observed circumstances has been eliminated: 
() ( ) i C C w I w I i ∀ = = , ~ . The mean value of all Theil indices as well as those corresponding to the 
extreme bounds are presented in the first three rows. The fourth row presents the share in   22
earnings inequality accounted for by the difference between observed inequality and the mean 
estimate of residual inequality, i.e.:  ( ) ( )
() w I





= Θ . This is our measure of inequality of 
opportunities in this decomposition. Because the coefficients should be unbiased, but we can not 
be sure that there are no unobserved circumstance variables in the residual term ui, we interpret 
this share as a lower bound. 
 
For men born between 1951 and 1955, for instance, elimination of inequality due to observed 
circumstances reduces the Theil index from 0.68 to some value between 0.527 and 0.554, with a 
mean estimate of 0.536. This mean estimate indicates that at least 21% of earnings inequality in 
this cohort is accounted for by unequal opportunities. Similarly, for women born between 1956 
and 1960, replacing individual values of circumstance variables with their means reduces the 
Theil from 0.71 to somewhere between 0.490 and 0.532, with a mean estimate of 0.503. This 
value yields an opportunity share of inequality of around 0.29. 
 
The share of inequality due to unequal opportunities varies across cohorts, between 16% and 
30% for men, and 14% and 32% for women. The simple average across cohorts is 22% for men, 
and 23% for women. As indicated by the subscript I in  I Θ , these shares depend on the specific 
inequality measure used. A perfectly analogous decomposition was conducted using the Gini 
coefficient, instead of the Theil index, and cohort averages for the Gini were 13% for men and 
12% for women. Detailed results for the Gini decomposition are available from the authors on 
request. 
 
The next panels (with four rows each) in Tables 6 and 7 present the sub-decomposition of 
inequality of opportunity into its direct and indirect components. The central and bounds 
estimates for counterfactual Theil coefficients in this panel correspond to the simulated 
distribution  { }
p w , obtained from  ( ) i i i
p
i u E C w Ln ˆ ˆ ˆ + + = β α . The difference between observed 
inequality and this inequality level can be accounted for by holding observed circumstances 
constant only in the earnings regressions, whilst not taking account of the impact of unequal 
circumstances on the levels of “efforts”, such as own schooling levels, a decision to migrate to   23
an area with greater income earning opportunities, or efforts to find a job in a better sector of the 
labor market.  
 
The fourth row of this panel presents our summary measure of this direct effect of unequal 
opportunities:  ( ) () [] () ()
1 :
− − = Θ w I w I w I
p d
I . This sub-component of inequality of opportunities 
averaged 15% for men across all seven cohorts, and 16% for women. This suggests that, on 
average, approximately 70% of the impact of opportunities on earnings takes the form of a direct 
effect, while the remaining 30% correspond to the indirect effect of circumstance on earnings 
through their impact on “efforts” – such as the effect of parental education on earnings through 
own schooling. A similar breakdown is found for the decomposition using the Gini coefficient. 
 
It is possible, of course, that the effect of circumstances on our “effort” variables (schooling, 
migration and labor market status) is greater than the effects captured through equations (9) – 
(11). If unobserved circumstances accounted for a large share of the variance in the random 
terms v, ξ, and ε, we could be underestimating the share of opportunities in earnings inequality. 
To shed some light on the magnitudes associated with this possibility, the bottom panels in both 
Table 6 and Table 7 report results from a thought experiment. Suppose schooling and migration 
decisions were taken entirely by a person’s parents, with no room for individual decision-
making, and that labor market status were also somehow exogenous. Those (rather extreme) 
assumptions would correspond to treating all of our observed “effort” variables as circumstances. 
Equalizing all observed variables in (8) – and treating all unobserved variance in u as the only 
true source of “effort” – yields the decomposition in this panel, derived from a simulation of 
( ) i i i i u E C w Ln ˆ ˆ ˆ
~ ~ + + = β α  Unsurprisingly, such a view of the world leads to much higher 
opportunity shares, as indicated in the bottom rows of Tables 6 and 7. These opportunity shares 
average of 40% for men and 45% for women, across cohorts.
30 
 
Figures 1 and 2 depict the decomposition graphically, for men and women. In both figures, the 
top line represents the inequality actually observed for the various cohorts. The line below it 
                                                 
30 It is important to note that the opportunity shares in this thought experiment correspond neither to a lower bound 
on inequality of opportunity (because it seems unreasonable to interpret schooling, migration and labor market status 
as fully exogenous), nor to an upper bound (because there are still likely to be unobserved circumstance variables in 
the residual term, u, of equation 8).   24
(with squares) shows the “partial” or direct effect of equalizing circumstances, whereas the 
bottom line (with circles) shows the “complete” effect. The dotted lines around the two bottom 
lines show upper and lower bounds for the preceding estimates. Inequality of opportunity, by 
each measure, corresponds to the difference between observed inequality (at the top) and the 
simulated inequality indices. The height of the counterfactual inequality measures corresponds to 
the residual component.  
 
Visual inspection of these figures reveals that male earnings inequality falls considerably from 
the older to the younger cohorts, while for women, inequality is lower for both the oldest and the 
youngest cohorts, and higher for those in between. It is important to recognize that temporal 
patterns can not be identified from these cohort trends. In particular, as already alluded to, 
returns to education in Brazil increase with age, leading to greater dispersion in earnings within 
older cohorts, at every time period.
31 It is also interesting that the share (as well as the absolute 
contribution) of inequality of opportunities in earnings inequality also seems to decline, albeit 
moderately, from the oldest to the youngest cohort. That share averages 25% (31%) for men 
(women) born between 1936 and 1945, as opposed to 21% (18%) for those born between 1961 
and 1970. This decline is in all likelihood driven by the falling coefficients on parental education 
in both the earnings and own schooling equations for both genders, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
To the extent that these shares are unrelated to age-group-specific levels of earnings inequality, 
the reductions in the shares of both parental education and father’s occupation (particularly for 
men) may signify a lower degree of inequality of opportunity for the younger cohorts in Brazil. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 evaluate the role of individual circumstance variables in the preceding results. 
The complete effect of equalizing each individual circumstance variable, while controlling for all 
others, but allowing them to take their observed values, is shown for the Theil coefficient 
separately for men and women. It can be seen that, of all circumstance variables, parental 
education plays the largest role in determining inequality, for both genders and across all 
cohorts.  Interestingly, the contribution of parental education to reducing earnings inequality is 
not much smaller when parental schooling is not equalized across the board, but instead a lower 
                                                 
31 This is particularly true for men. Evidence of this age-dependence of earnings inequality in other countries is 
analyzed in Deaton and Paxson (1994).     25
bound (of six school years) is imposed, as if schooling were compulsory until a certain age. This 
suggests that it is the inequality of education at the bottom of the distribution that matters most to 
explaining the contribution of opportunities to earnings inequality.  
 
Reinforcing the importance of family background as the key set of circumstances which shape 
opportunity sets for the young, father’s occupation is the second most important circumstance, 
although this is more pronounced for men than for women. Even for men, there is a clear 
downward trend in the contribution of this variable, as one moves from the older to the younger 
cohorts. When parental occupation and education are already controlled for, race alone seems to 
account for very little inequality in opportunities. These results suggest that the most effective 
policies for reducing inequality of opportunities in Brazil would be those that reduced the effect 
of parental education on their child’s schooling and earnings. This conclusion  is even stronger 




This paper sought to quantify the role of inequality of opportunity – associated with family 
background, race, and region of origin – in generating inequality in current earnings in Brazil. 
We estimated the impact of opportunities (or circumstances) both directly on earnings, and 
indirectly on a number of individual “effort” variables – such as schooling, the decision to 
migrate, or one’s broad status in the labor market. We took account of the biases arising from the 
endogeneity of these “efforts”, by calculating upper and lower bounds for the unbiased estimates, 
drawn from Monte-Carlo simulations based on the universe of admissible values for the bias.  
 
Altogether, we find that a group of four observed circumstance variables (namely parental 
schooling, father’s occupation, race and region of birth) account for more than a fifth of the total 
earnings inequality within gender/cohort groups in Brazil in 1996, as measured by the Theil 
index. For some cohorts, particularly the older ones, this share is nearer 30%. The impact of 
opportunities, defined in this way, was further decomposed into a direct effect on earnings 
(which accounts for some 70% of the total), and an indirect effect through the effort decisions 
individuals make. Regardless of the channel, our analysis suggests that family background is the   26
most important set of circumstances determining a person’s opportunities. Fifty-five to 75 
percent of the total effect of circumstances can be attributed to parental schooling alone, and this 
figure rises to 70 to 80 percent  when the father's occupation is added. There is also some 
evidence that inequality of opportunity may account for a lower share of earnings inequality in 
the younger cohorts, which may be consistent with an actual decline in that component of 
inequality over time. 
 
Considering the fact that our analysis was based on only four observed circumstance variables, 
and that components of unobserved circumstances which are not correlated with them
32 may be 
present in the residual term, we interpret these shares as lower-bound estimates of the inequality 
of opportunity in Brazil. Furthermore, the variance of the residual term ui, which accounts for a 
large share of the residual component of the decomposition, includes not only genuine rewards to 
differences in unobserved effort, but also measurement error and transitory income 
components.
33 In this light, a lower bound share of inequality of opportunity of over 20% is not 
insubstantial. While the remaining residual inequality is still very large – and in fact larger than 
total inequality in most OECD countries – we can certainly conclude that unequal opportunities 
account for a substantial share of observed inequality in Brazil. It would be interesting for future 
research to explore this question further, with better measures of life-time earnings or permanent 
consumption, for which transitory components might be lower. As the literature on 
intergenerational mobility in the United States has shown, the extent to which one can average 
out earnings volatility and measure “permanent” economic status has a considerable impact on 
estimates of intergenerational persistence and, hence, on the share of inequality accounted for by 
opportunities. 
 
To the extent that Brazilian policy-makers are averse to unequal opportunities, our analysis may 
have some policy implications. Figures 1 and 2 showed that both the direct and the indirect 
effects of circumstances on earnings are important, each in its own right. This suggests that 
                                                 
32 In the absence of wealth data, it is impossible to determine how well family wealth correlates with parental 
education and occupation. As a rough gauge, we ran a regression of current income on current occupation, education 
and region of birth for the PNAD respondents with children. R-squares are in the range 0.31 - 0.42, depending on 
the cohort.  
33 Atkinson et. al (1992) report that the share of transitory components in the variance of the logarithm of current 
earnings is around 30% in a number of developed countries. See also Lillard and Willis (1978) for the original US 
study.   27
policies aimed at equalizing opportunity may be warranted both  inside and beyond the 
classroom. Parental education – and, to a lesser extent, occupation – do affect the length of 
children’s school careers. Efforts to reduce this dependence, through conditional cash-based 
assistance to poor students and their families, or through measures to enhance the quality of 
schooling supplied across the country’s schools – such as after-school programs for students who 
may be falling behind, or through curriculum changes in teacher-training programs which aim to 
strengthen teacher capacity to support the weakest students - might well deserve consideration. 
But family background clearly also impacts on earnings directly, even after conditioning on own 
schooling. In fact, this direct effect of family background seems to be quantitatively more 
important than the indirect effects. This is consistent with hypotheses that both employment and 
career advancement opportunities may be allocated in part through socially-based networks.
34 In 
this paper, we have not presented any evidence on the existence of such networks, or on their 
welfare properties, but further investigation of their operation in the Brazilian case is warranted, 
and may be relevant for the ongoing debate on affirmative action in Brazil, and in other 
countries. 
                                                 
34 Evidence from elsewhere suggests that socially-based networks can be effective in matching workers from certain 
families to coveted jobs. One example is the traditional segmentation of blue-collar occupations in Bombay by jati 
(or sub-caste) groups. While such labor-market effects are likely to impact on educational decisions (as explored by 
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2003), they also constitute a direct impact of family background on earning opportunities, 
conditional on the child’s schooling attainment.    28
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b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
Mean monthly earnings (Reais, all jobs) 561.3 753.6 812.2 808.0 736.8 658.5 543.7
Mean number of years of schooling 4.5 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.5 7.8 7.7
Mean  father's number of years of schooling 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.5
Mean mother's number of  years of schooling 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.2
Race  (Percents)
Branca (whites) 60.0% 59.2% 59.4% 59.9% 58.7% 59.6% 57.9%
Preta (blacks) 6.5% 6.7% 6.3% 6.2% 5.7% 5.2% 5.7%
Amarela (Asians) 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
Parda (MR) 33.0% 33.3% 33.8% 33.4% 35.2% 34.8% 36.1%
Regions ( Percents)
North 6.2% 6.8% 6.9% 7.5% 7.7% 7.5% 7.8%
North East 23.8% 25.6% 24.2% 22.2% 23.1% 23.3% 24.3%
South East 39.5% 37.8% 38.6% 38.7% 37.1% 36.5% 34.0%
South 21.3% 20.4% 20.4% 21.7% 21.2% 21.3% 20.9%
Center-West 9.1% 9.4% 9.9% 10.0% 10.9% 11.4% 13.0%
Migrants (Percents) 70.2% 69.4% 68.5% 66.3% 63.0% 59.4% 57.5%
Father's occupational status
Rural workers 28.65% 24.47% 22.89% 21.02% 18.76% 16.28% 14.97%
Domestic servants 35.06% 36.05% 32.30% 30.32% 27.88% 25.86% 25.07%
Traditional sector workers 6.72% 7.37% 8.22% 8.84% 10.08% 11.09% 12.84%
Service sector workers 5.95% 6.01% 6.27% 7.00% 7.85% 8.61% 9.42%
Modern industry workers 5.95% 6.56% 8.00% 9.59% 11.68% 12.94% 14.43%
Self-employed shopkeepers 6.18% 6.92% 7.67% 7.55% 7.77% 8.15% 7.30%
Technitians, artists and desk workers 4.75% 4.63% 6.12% 7.18% 7.68% 9.02% 8.55%
Employers 5.25% 5.02% 4.96% 4.85% 4.60% 3.73% 3.89%
Liberal professionals 1.51% 2.97% 3.57% 3.65% 3.71% 4.33% 3.54%
Labor market status
Formal employees 32.6% 37.6% 45.9% 50.3% 51.5% 51.3% 53.3%
Informal employees 16.3% 15.2% 15.0% 14.5% 16.1% 17.9% 20.0%
Self-employed 44.3% 39.3% 32.8% 28.8% 25.9% 25.0% 22.3%
Employers 6.8% 7.8% 6.3% 6.5% 6.5% 5.8% 4.3%
Number of individuals  2590 3842 6025 8167 9327 9498 7463
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, by 5-year birth cohorts.  32
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b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
SELECTION EQUATION (Dep.var.=1 if hourly wages>0)
Race dummies
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) 0.169 -0.307 0.134 0.092 -0.046 -0.183 0.363
[0.268] [0.213] [0.213] [0.204] [0.175] [0.202] [0.248]
      Amarela (Asians) 4.848 -1.267** -0.786 4.575 4.595 4.059 4.576
[0.000] [0.539] [0.537] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
      Parda (MR) -0.058 -0.275** -0.116 -0.207** -0.021 -0.162 0.146
[0.152] [0.137] [0.116] [0.104] [0.109] [0.108] [0.123]
Years of schooling 0.195*** 0.142*** 0.091*** 0.086** -0.008 0.03 -0.097*
[0.046] [0.043] [0.035] [0.034] [0.040] [0.040] [0.058]
Years of schooling-squared -0.009*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.006* 0.004 0.014***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
Family type dummies
Couple with children (omitted)
Couple, no children 0.053 -0.246 -0.334* 0.016 0.038 0.376 -0.081
[0.210] [0.182] [0.171] [0.213] [0.235] [0.300] [0.200]
Mother with children 0.388** 0.372** 0.453*** 0.321** 0.525*** 0.647*** 0.822***
[0.172] [0.154] [0.141] [0.127] [0.165] [0.239] [0.302]
Others 0.306 -0.159 0.029 -0.142 4.681 4.756 0.392
[0.256] [0.246] [0.281] [0.299] [0.000] [0.000] [0.452]
Number of children 0.117 -0.064 -0.069* -0.03 -0.043 -0.069* -0.001
[0.077] [0.042] [0.036] [0.031] [0.032] [0.039] [0.054]
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.772*** -0.009 -0.515*** 0.25 0.055 -0.034 0.006
[0.277] [0.250] [0.192] [0.214] [0.225] [0.232] [0.241]
      North East 0.272 0.052 0.058 0.071 -0.114 -0.067 -0.01
[0.169] [0.145] [0.131] [0.116] [0.121] [0.127] [0.137]
      South -0.22 -0.309** -0.280** -0.143 -0.371*** -0.338*** 0.034
[0.163] [0.155] [0.133] [0.124] [0.121] [0.126] [0.146]
      Center-West 0.072 5.535 -0.223 -0.025 0.119 -0.371** -0.009
[0.304] [0.000] [0.214] [0.209] [0.234] [0.168] [0.202]
Household income (excluding own) 0.083 0.078 -0.022 0.085 0.142** 0.033 0.288***
[0.075] [0.067] [0.057] [0.054] [0.057] [0.063] [0.071]
Constant 0.109 0.801** 1.532*** 0.997*** 1.113*** 1.567*** 0.221
[0.433] [0.374] [0.331] [0.308] [0.315] [0.352] [0.403]
Self-selection correction term -1.035** -1.086** -0.191 -3.195 -2.005** -0.554 -2.754**
[0.507] [0.494] [0.372] [2.170] [0.994] [0.385] [1.246]
Standard error of residual 1.03 1.09 0.76 3.2 2.01 0.75 2.75
Number of obs 812 1276 2129 3006 3425 3354 2554
Censored obs 92 105 115 116 112 111 94
a) Dependent variable is participation.  b) Two-stage Heckman estimates, standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2.c: First Stage Selection Equations by cohort, women (cont'd).  35
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -1.505*** -1.247*** -0.906*** -1.205*** -1.638*** -1.480*** -1.032***
[0.344] [0.298] [0.257] [0.227] [0.214] [0.203] [0.213]
      Amarela (Asians) 5.967*** 2.788*** 1.999*** 2.761*** 1.694** 2.416*** -1.329
[1.281] [0.659] [0.707] [0.709] [0.670] [0.695] [0.982]
      Parda (MR) -0.826*** -1.192*** -1.156*** -1.117*** -1.145*** -1.238*** -0.729***
[0.193] [0.170] [0.144] [0.124] [0.112] [0.105] [0.111]
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) 0.742*** 0.745*** 0.684*** 0.622*** 0.585*** 0.552*** 0.494***
[0.042] [0.034] [0.027] [0.023] [0.019] [0.017] [0.018]
      Mother/father difference (years) 0.075* -0.014 0.058** 0.004 -0.012 0.015 0.005
[0.043] [0.037] [0.029] [0.025] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019]
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -1.374*** -0.733 -0.688** -0.391 -0.298 -0.418* -0.493*
[0.487] [0.474] [0.344] [0.297] [0.254] [0.252] [0.265]
      North East -0.853*** -0.953*** -0.586*** -1.037*** -1.085*** -0.768*** -0.987***
[0.197] [0.169] [0.145] [0.130] [0.120] [0.114] [0.120]
      South 0.008 -0.305 -0.596*** -0.486*** -0.288** -0.135 -0.305**
[0.240] [0.215] [0.173] [0.142] [0.126] [0.118] [0.132]
      Center-West 0.287 0.39 -0.332 0.373 -0.172 0.239 -0.19
[0.541] [0.418] [0.338] [0.283] [0.234] [0.209] [0.207]
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.441** 0.451** 0.400** 0.708*** 0.760*** 0.972*** 0.522***
[0.200] [0.180] [0.157] [0.143] [0.136] [0.136] [0.149]
Traditional sector workers 1.890*** 1.503*** 1.775*** 1.636*** 1.547*** 1.531*** 1.360***
[0.335] [0.307] [0.237] [0.196] [0.176] [0.166] [0.175]
Service sector workers 1.927*** 2.201*** 2.797*** 2.538*** 2.278*** 2.132*** 2.045***
[0.347] [0.329] [0.266] [0.221] [0.190] [0.182] [0.193]
Modern industry workers 2.521*** 2.599*** 2.707*** 2.945*** 3.024*** 2.678*** 1.701***
[0.387] [0.328] [0.249] [0.208] [0.175] [0.165] [0.178]
Self-employed shopkeepers 4.190*** 3.342*** 4.029*** 3.331*** 3.439*** 3.228*** 2.651***
[0.391] [0.332] [0.262] [0.230] [0.211] [0.202] [0.227]
Technitians, artists and desk workers 3.920*** 2.883*** 3.817*** 3.188*** 2.961*** 2.702*** 2.032***
[0.449] [0.416] [0.303] [0.252] [0.213] [0.200] [0.224]
Employers 2.026*** 2.570*** 2.506*** 2.747*** 2.670*** 2.219*** 1.988***
[0.405] [0.361] [0.305] [0.271] [0.255] [0.264] [0.281]
Liberal professionals 3.291*** 2.485*** 2.951*** 3.098*** 2.584*** 2.446*** 2.288***
[0.842] [0.553] [0.430] [0.373] [0.323] [0.301] [0.338]
Constant 2.756*** 3.491*** 3.857*** 4.499*** 4.804*** 4.909*** 5.138***
[0.174] [0.167] [0.145] [0.129] [0.123] [0.126] [0.138]
Sample size 1760 2462 3702 4844 5427 5594 4509
Adj R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.35
a) Dependent variable is years of schooling. b) OLS estimates standard errors in brackets;* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
Table 3.a: Schooling determinants, men. a), b)  36
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) 0.433 -1.083** -1.878*** -1.059*** -1.824*** -1.610*** -1.411***
[0.425] [0.422] [0.325] [0.281] [0.256] [0.275] [0.278]
      Amarela (Asians) 2.145** 1.601 3.053*** 0.857 2.641*** 3.159*** 1.625
[1.082] [1.123] [0.908] [0.887] [0.810] [0.903] [1.016]
      Parda (MR) -0.455* -0.843*** -1.392*** -1.359*** -0.654*** -1.152*** -1.167***
[0.251] [0.257] [0.188] [0.159] [0.140] [0.135] [0.149]
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) 0.820*** 0.719*** 0.730*** 0.620*** 0.607*** 0.517*** 0.476***
[0.050] [0.049] [0.034] [0.028] [0.023] [0.021] [0.023]
      Mother/father difference (years) 0.125** -0.032 0.069** 0.080*** 0.095*** 0.037* 0.077***
[0.049] [0.052] [0.034] [0.027] [0.023] [0.021] [0.022]
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.007 -0.162 0.268 0.389 0.051 -0.047 -0.087
[0.662] [0.581] [0.434] [0.343] [0.313] [0.307] [0.343]
      North East -0.529** -0.308 -0.06 -0.117 -0.733*** -0.305** -0.525***
[0.251] [0.258] [0.189] [0.168] [0.149] [0.146] [0.160]
      South -0.092 -0.315 -0.590*** -0.432** -0.511*** -0.484*** -0.722***
[0.301] [0.301] [0.218] [0.187] [0.161] [0.152] [0.167]
      Center-West 0.101 -0.092 -0.563 0.731** 0.064 0.326 0.009
[0.562] [0.595] [0.415] [0.349] [0.288] [0.255] [0.252]
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.662** 0.585** 0.744*** 0.641*** 0.989*** 1.231*** 1.085***
[0.262] [0.270] [0.207] [0.185] [0.171] [0.174] [0.198]
Traditional sector workers 1.689*** 2.495*** 2.177*** 1.815*** 1.723*** 2.141*** 1.762***
[0.453] [0.430] [0.306] [0.278] [0.227] [0.218] [0.232]
Service sector workers 1.738*** 2.306*** 3.169*** 2.235*** 2.300*** 2.501*** 2.111***
[0.462] [0.465] [0.347] [0.286] [0.254] [0.235] [0.254]
Modern industry workers 3.462*** 2.770*** 3.246*** 2.734*** 2.883*** 3.070*** 2.668***
[0.455] [0.491] [0.319] [0.268] [0.229] [0.217] [0.231]
Self-employed shopkeepers 4.109*** 3.354*** 4.482*** 3.954*** 3.927*** 4.010*** 3.331***
[0.500] [0.454] [0.345] [0.287] [0.249] [0.244] [0.279]
Technitians, artists and desk workers 2.006*** 2.356*** 3.149*** 3.144*** 3.146*** 3.509*** 2.592***
[0.574] [0.612] [0.394] [0.320] [0.279] [0.261] [0.283]
Employers 1.547*** 1.571*** 3.324*** 2.847*** 2.619*** 2.743*** 3.031***
[0.502] [0.596] [0.427] [0.355] [0.321] [0.329] [0.370]
Liberal professionals 3.229*** 3.758*** 3.344*** 2.770*** 2.815*** 2.870*** 2.133***
[0.893] [0.868] [0.529] [0.456] [0.368] [0.345] [0.415]
Constant 1.842*** 3.301*** 3.704*** 4.698*** 4.924*** 5.087*** 5.719***
[0.240] [0.251] [0.190] [0.168] [0.156] [0.159] [0.185]
Sample size 899 1439 2373 3360 3938 3939 2976
Adj R-squared 0.48 0.34 0.44 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.36
a) Dependent variable is years of schooling. b) OLS estimates standard errors in brackets;* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
Table 3.b: Schooling determinants, women. a), b)  37
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) 0.007 -0.02 -0.024 -0.046 -0.066** -0.047 -0.102***
[0.049] [0.041] [0.035] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.034]
      Amarela (Asians) . 0.158** 0.190*** . 0.032 0.219*** 0.131
. [0.068] [0.061] . [0.094] [0.084] [0.143]
      Parda (MR) -0.055* -0.029 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.023 -0.032*
[0.029] [0.024] [0.019] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018]
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (yea-0.006 -0.011** -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005* 0
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
      Mother/father difference (yea-0.003 -0.008* 0 -0.006* -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.130* -0.111* -0.043 -0.106** -0.011 0.06 0.025
[0.075] [0.067] [0.047] [0.042] [0.037] [0.037] [0.041]
      North East 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.168*** 0.162***
[0.027] [0.022] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018]
      South 0.022 0.067** 0.056*** 0.048** 0.133*** 0.149*** 0.185***
[0.033] [0.027] [0.021] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019]
      Center-West 0.009 0.019 0.03 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.125***
[0.076] [0.054] [0.042] [0.033] [0.030] [0.028] [0.029]
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants -0.038 -0.058** -0.102*** -0.046** -0.044** -0.021 -0.084***
[0.030] [0.025] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.024]
Traditional sector workers -0.057 -0.07 -0.079** -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.083*** -0.137***
[0.050] [0.044] [0.034] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.028]
Service sector workers -0.083 -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.169*** -0.081*** -0.125*** -0.139***
[0.054] [0.048] [0.038] [0.032] [0.029] [0.028] [0.031]
Modern industry workers -0.149** -0.133*** -0.168*** -0.178*** -0.158*** -0.129*** -0.186***
[0.059] [0.048] [0.036] [0.030] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028]
Self-employed shopkeepers -0.069 -0.107** -0.167*** -0.142*** -0.151*** -0.141*** -0.178***
[0.058] [0.048] [0.038] [0.034] [0.032] [0.031] [0.036]
Technitians, artists and desk wo -0.180*** -0.063 -0.221*** -0.230*** -0.126*** -0.102*** -0.183***
[0.069] [0.059] [0.044] [0.036] [0.032] [0.031] [0.035]
Employers -0.001 -0.013 -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.046 -0.068 -0.105**
[0.059] [0.050] [0.044] [0.039] [0.038] [0.042] [0.045]
Liberal professionals -0.226* 0.011 -0.077 -0.150*** -0.185*** -0.094** -0.128**
[0.133] [0.074] [0.061] [0.054] [0.048] [0.047] [0.054]
Sample size 1685 2402 3651 4783 5389 5557 4486
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Table 4.a: Probit estimates for migration, men. a), b)
a) Dependent variable is migrant status.  b) Probit marginal effect estimates reported (standard errors in brackets);* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
   38
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.024 -0.117** -0.032 -0.065* -0.087** -0.113*** -0.064
[0.068] [0.054] [0.043] [0.037] [0.036] [0.040] [0.043]
      Amarela (Asians) 0.094 0.261*** 0.131 0.174* 0.09 -0.398***
[0.122] [0.059] [0.094] [0.092] [0.124] [0.116]
      Parda (MR) -0.092** -0.107*** 0.014 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.001
[0.040] [0.032] [0.024] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023]
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling-0.014* -0.005 -0.014*** -0.006* -0.005* -0.008** -0.003
[0.008] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
      Mother/father difference-0.012* 0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006** -0.005 0.002
[0.008] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North 0.003 -0.1 -0.096* -0.061 -0.045 -0.018 -0.026
[0.097] [0.073] [0.058] [0.044] [0.043] [0.044] [0.052]
      North East 0.175*** 0.072** 0.082*** 0.108*** 0.132*** 0.092*** 0.122***
[0.035] [0.030] [0.023] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.023]
      South -0.024 -0.016 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.125*** 0.181***
[0.046] [0.036] [0.026] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024]
      Center-West 0.029 0.03 0.092* 0.133*** 0.080** 0.081** 0.146***
[0.082] [0.068] [0.048] [0.037] [0.037] [0.035] [0.035]
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants -0.064 0.024 -0.057** -0.070*** -0.048** -0.021 -0.085***
[0.042] [0.032] [0.028] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.031]
Traditional sector workers0.001 -0.063 -0.184*** -0.206*** -0.177*** -0.088*** -0.110***
[0.072] [0.053] [0.042] [0.037] [0.032] [0.032] [0.036]
Service sector workers -0.160** -0.015 -0.07 -0.181*** -0.161*** -0.095*** -0.157***
[0.078] [0.056] [0.047] [0.038] [0.035] [0.034] [0.038]
Modern industry workers -0.123 0.001 -0.179*** -0.221*** -0.130*** -0.110*** -0.172***
[0.076] [0.058] [0.044] [0.036] [0.032] [0.031] [0.035]
Self-employed shopkeeper-0.166** -0.171*** -0.063 -0.170*** -0.105*** -0.156*** -0.148***
[0.084] [0.058] [0.047] [0.039] [0.035] [0.035] [0.042]
Technitians, artists and de -0.126 -0.102 -0.048 -0.191*** -0.208*** -0.121*** -0.223***
[0.096] [0.077] [0.053] [0.043] [0.038] [0.038] [0.040]
Employers 0.067 0.029 -0.004 -0.078 -0.044 -0.055 -0.160***
[0.073] [0.070] [0.057] [0.048] [0.045] [0.048] [0.055]
Liberal professionals -0.116 -0.154 -0.105 -0.218*** -0.181*** -0.121** -0.130**
[0.147] [0.112] [0.072] [0.061] [0.051] [0.050] [0.062]
Sample size 894 1439 2373 3360 3938 3939 2976
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Table 4.b: Probit estimates for migration, women. a), b)
a) Dependent variable is migrant status. b) Probit marginal effect estimates (standard errors in brackets);* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  39
INFORMAL EMPLOYEE
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) 0.034 * 0.082 *** 0.006 0.062 *** 0.064 *** 0.060 *** 0.104 ***
      Amarela (Asians) -0.165 * 0.055 -0.028 -0.043 -0.004 0.149 0.184
      Parda (MR) 0.048 ** 0.039 ** 0.020 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.056 *** 0.043 ***
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) -0.005 -0.012 *** -0.011 *** -0.004 -0.009 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 **
      Mother/father difference (years) -0.004 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.000 -0.005 *
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North 0.045 -0.016 0.001 0.029 0.041 ** 0.042 * 0.024
      North East -0.021 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.017 0.007 0.036 **
      South -0.020 0.012 -0.001 -0.014 -0.003 0.006 -0.005
      Center-West 0.100 * 0.078 ** 0.029 0.003 0.067 *** 0.040 ** 0.076 ***
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants -0.070 *** -0.025 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.026 * -0.031 *
Traditional sector workers -0.108 *** -0.049 * -0.057 ** -0.019 -0.026 -0.030 * -0.053 ***
Service sector workers -0.075 ** -0.056 * -0.038 -0.058 *** -0.022 -0.039 ** -0.044 *
Modern industry workers -0.069 * -0.026 -0.014 -0.042 ** -0.028 -0.054 *** -0.069 ***
Self-employed shopkeepers -0.048 -0.055 * -0.031 -0.049 ** -0.049 ** -0.041 * -0.052 *
Technitians, artists and desk workers -0.021 0.065 -0.034 -0.041 * -0.033 -0.043 * -0.079 ***
Employers -0.075 * 0.003 -0.075 ** -0.055 ** -0.048 -0.058 * -0.075 **
Liberal professionals -0.088 -0.029 0.022 -0.024 0.034 -0.045 -0.075 *
SELF-EMPLOYED
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.020 * -0.169 *** -0.041 -0.066 * -0.056 * -0.004 -0.010
      Amarela (Asians) 0.139 *** -0.184 0.000 -0.105 -0.072 -0.060 0.111
      Parda (MR) -0.027 -0.016 -0.007 0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.006
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 *** -0.005 * -0.003 -0.002
      Mother/father difference (years) -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North 0.102 * 0.087 0.187 *** 0.065 * 0.084 *** 0.088 *** 0.159 ***
      North East 0.130 *** 0.075 *** 0.089 *** 0.058 *** 0.059 *** 0.038 ** 0.077 ***
      South 0.056 0.013 0.085 *** 0.010 0.007 0.017 0.019
      Center-West -0.037 -0.038 0.064 0.055 0.045 0.023 0.068 ***
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.092 *** 0.057 ** 0.062 *** 0.070 *** 0.024 0.009 0.064 ***
Traditional sector workers 0.126 ** 0.113 ** 0.029 0.039 0.020 -0.019 0.044 *
Service sector workers 0.100 * 0.089 * 0.025 -0.005 0.006 -0.039 0.051 *
Modern industry workers 0.014 -0.027 -0.013 -0.001 -0.037 -0.017 0.002
Self-employed shopkeepers 0.059 0.038 0.006 0.021 0.017 0.006 0.052 **
Technitians, artists and desk workers -0.063 -0.001 -0.020 -0.010 -0.058 * -0.048 0.007
Employers 0.091 -0.096 -0.035 0.030 -0.033 0.023 0.044
Liberal professionals 0.102 -0.070 0.000 0.014 0.029 -0.040 0.077
Table 5.a: Multinomial logit estimates for labor market status, men.
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
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 EMPLOYER
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.077 *** -0.034 -0.038 * -0.042 ** -0.024 -0.042 *** -0.029 **
      Amarela (Asians) -0.006 *** 0.053 0.083 0.021 -0.040 0.001 0.010
      Parda (MR) -0.012 *** -0.040 *** -0.033 *** -0.041 *** -0.029 *** -0.031 *** -0.013 **
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) 0.001 * 0.010 *** 0.007 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ***
      Mother/father difference (years) 0.001 * 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.002 0.020 -0.019 -0.007 -0.022 -0.023 -0.012
      North East -0.006 ** -0.013 -0.009 -0.026 -0.006 -0.005 -0.016 **
      South -0.005 ** 0.009 -0.010 0.012 0.010 0.003 -0.011
      Center-West -0.003 0.020 0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.028 ** -0.009
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.009 ** 0.021 * 0.024 * 0.025 * 0.028 ** 0.034 ** 0.013
Traditional sector workers 0.001 -0.026 0.025 0.027 0.005 0.015 -0.019
Service sector workers 0.008 -0.001 0.018 0.026 0.020 0.030 * 0.006
Modern industry workers 0.013 * 0.025 0.028 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.035 **
Self-employed shopkeepers 0.025 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.097 *** 0.113 *** 0.116 *** 0.116 ***
Technitians, artists and desk workers 0.003 -0.002 0.037 -0.033 * 0.007 0.023 0.016
Employers 0.049 *** 0.109 *** 0.234 *** 0.101 *** 0.188 *** 0.125 *** 0.101 ***
Liberal professionals -0.004 0.083 0.022 0.017 0.003 0.072 ** 0.065 **
Observations 1691 2402 3651 4805 5389 5557 4486
PseudoR2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Formal employee is the base category. Marginal effect estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5.a: Multinomial logit estimates for labor market status, men. Cont'd.
b1936_40 b1941_45 b1946_50 b1951_55 b1956_60 b1961_65 b1966_70
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INFORMAL EMPLOYEE
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.023 0.063 0.149 *** 0.086 *** 0.050 * 0.125 *** 0.171 ***
      Amarela (Asians) 0.154 -0.025 *** -0.200 *** -0.028 -0.008 -0.223 *** 0.006
      Parda (MR) 0.043 0.038 0.044 *** 0.071 *** 0.038 ** 0.067 *** 0.104 ***
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) -0.022 *** -0.025 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.016 ***
      Mother/father difference (years) -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.008 ** 0.000 0.000 -0.006
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.066 -0.089 -0.078 ** -0.069 ** -0.061 ** 0.020 -0.038
      North East -0.063 * -0.060 * -0.039 ** -0.064 *** -0.018 0.020 -0.009
      South -0.025 0.035 -0.012 -0.003 0.010 0.024 0.028
      Center-West 0.007 0.026 0.031 -0.023 0.017 0.020 0.042
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants -0.022 -0.043 0.004 -0.011 -0.042 ** -0.054 ** -0.036
Traditional sector workers -0.076 -0.009 -0.016 -0.038 -0.059 ** -0.036 -0.068 **
Service sector workers -0.124 * -0.022 -0.042 -0.063 ** -0.074 ** -0.116 *** -0.050
Modern industry workers 0.047 -0.083 -0.052 -0.101 *** -0.105 *** -0.086 *** -0.112 ***
Self-employed shopkeepers -0.110 * -0.054 -0.057 -0.119 *** -0.126 *** -0.129 *** -0.104 ***
Technitians, artists and desk workers -0.019 -0.030 -0.007 -0.088 *** -0.082 ** -0.082 ** -0.153 ***
Employers -0.075 0.046 -0.066 -0.061 * -0.087 ** -0.114 *** -0.109 **
Liberal professionals -0.054 0.141 -0.057 -0.121 ** -0.091 * -0.133 *** -0.081
SELF-EMPLOYED
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.195 ** -0.079 -0.125 ** -0.098 ** -0.039 -0.019 -0.092 **
      Amarela (Asians) -0.311 0.410 *** -0.267 *** 0.064 -0.137 0.056 *** 0.060
      Parda (MR) -0.041 0.010 -0.001 -0.010 0.015 0.022 -0.008
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) 0.006 -0.003 -0.013 ** -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 * -0.006 *
      Mother/father difference (years) -0.017 * -0.004 -0.002 0.006 * -0.002 0.003 -0.005 *
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North 0.269 *** 0.058 0.077 * 0.073 ** 0.098 *** -0.033 0.100 **
      North East 0.088 * 0.101 *** 0.080 *** 0.066 *** 0.084 *** 0.069 *** 0.076 ***
      South 0.101 * 0.036 0.016 -0.018 0.008 0.003 -0.016
      Center-West -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.066 0.004 0.045 -0.006
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.051 0.054 0.034 0.000 0.049 ** -0.004 0.072 **
Traditional sector workers 0.071 -0.071 0.028 0.019 0.029 -0.017 0.009
Service sector workers 0.183 ** 0.006 -0.002 0.055 0.044 0.016 0.075 *
Modern industry workers -0.132 -0.006 0.011 -0.015 -0.006 -0.020 0.024
Self-employed shopkeepers 0.011 0.029 -0.016 0.045 * 0.009 0.027 ** 0.006
Technitians, artists and desk workers -0.011 0.028 -0.023 -0.032 0.010 -0.078 * 0.042
Employers 0.115 0.031 0.031 -0.026 0.042 -0.060 0.025
Liberal professionals -0.038 -0.200 * 0.027 -0.009 -0.012 0.085 ** 0.015
b1966_70
Table 5.b: Multinomial logit estimates for labor market status, women.
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 EMPLOYER
Race
      Branca (whites, omitted)
      Preta (Black) -0.009 *** -0.035 *** -0.019 -0.030 ** -0.020 -0.029 *** -0.017 **
      Amarela (Asians) -0.001 *** 0.008 0.194 *** 0.098 ** 0.127 ** 0.045 *** -0.020 ***
      Parda (MR) -0.001 *** -0.002 -0.024 *** -0.020 *** -0.025 * -0.012 * -0.008
Parental schooling 
      Mean parental schooling (years) 0.000 * 0.001 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ***
      Mother/father difference (years) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000
Region dummies
      South East (omitted)
      North -0.002 *** -0.002 -0.026 ** 0.010 -0.011 -0.019 * -0.010
      North East 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.014 * 0.001 -0.007 -0.001
      South -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
      Center-West 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.019 0.001 -0.009 0.002
Father's occupational status
Rural workers (omitted)
Domestic servants 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.074 *** 0.012
Traditional sector workers 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.027 0.005 0.073 ** 0.003
Service sector workers 0.002 0.010 ** -0.005 -0.018 0.027 0.132 *** -0.004
Modern industry workers 0.002 -0.001 0.014 0.009 0.021 0.088 *** 0.032 *
Self-employed shopkeepers 0.002 0.013 *** -0.002 0.041 ** 0.061 *** 0.170 *** 0.054 ***
Technitians, artists and desk workers 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.043 ** 0.073 *** 0.031 *
Employers 0.010 *** 0.011 ** 0.013 0.019 0.084 *** 0.208 ** 0.125 ***
Liberal professionals 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.003 0.067 ** 0.080 *** 0.027
Observations 899 1439 2373 3360 3938 3939 2976
PseudoR2 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Formal employee is the base category. Marginal effect estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5.b: Multinomial logit estimates for labor market status, women. Cont'd.





  Total Observed Inequality (1) 0.977 1.001 0.746 0.680 0.728 0.561 0.553
"Complete" effect of equalizing circumstances
(Upper bound estimate) (0.904) (0.742) (0.696) (0.554) (0.575) (0.424) (0.505)
Mean estimate (2a) 0.780 0.698 0.626 0.536 0.565 0.410 0.466
(Lower bound estimate) (0.752) (0.678) (0.602) (0.527) (0.561) (0.405) (0.457)
Share =((1)-(2a))/(1) 0.202 0.302 0.161 0.212 0.223 0.269 0.157
"Partial" effect of equalizing circumstances
(Upper bound estimate) (0.927) (0.848) (0.675) (0.611) (0.657) (0.494) (0.494)
Mean estimate (2b) 0.854 0.811 0.629 0.579 0.636 0.459 0.480
(Lower bound estimate) (0.800) (0.667) (0.597) (0.560) (0.598) (0.440) (0.471)
Share =((1)-(2b))/(1) 0.126 0.190 0.157 0.148 0.126 0.183 0.132
Treating observed efforts as circumstance variables
(Upper bound estimate) (0.701) (0.749) (0.670) (0.443) (0.452) (0.337) (0.415)
Mean estimate (2c) 0.638 0.483 0.422 0.432 0.436 0.317 0.370
(Lower bound estimate) (0.618) (0.454) (0.410) (0.424) (0.423) (0.314) (0.356)
Share =((1)-(2c))/(1) 0.347 0.518 0.434 0.365 0.401 0.435 0.332
Table 6. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality. Simulation results.
Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts of men.
b1936_40b1941_45b1946_50b1951_55b1956_60b1961_65b1966_70
  Total Observed Inequality (1) 0.629 0.643 0.795 0.728 0.710 0.754 0.581
"Complete" effect of equalizing circumstances
(Upper bound estimate) (0.441) (0.513) (0.768) (0.660) (0.532) (0.637) (0.507)
Mean estimate (2a) 0.437 0.438 0.686 0.579 0.503 0.626 0.468
(Lower bound estimate) (0.432) (0.430) (0.651) (0.531) (0.490) (0.620) (0.429)
Share =((1)-(2a))/(1) 0.305 0.319 0.136 0.205 0.291 0.169 0.194
"Partial" effect of equalizing circumstances
(Upper bound estimate) (0.585) (0.557) (0.714) (0.670) (0.625) (0.681) (0.500)
Mean estimate (2b) 0.507 0.531 0.697 0.637 0.593 0.652 0.474
(Lower bound estimate) (0.451) (0.494) (0.672) (0.597) (0.560) (0.643) (0.448)
Share =((1)-(2b))/(1) 0.195 0.174 0.122 0.125 0.165 0.135 0.184
Treating observed efforts as circumstance variables
(Upper bound estimate) (0.419) (0.322) (0.444) (0.426) (0.363) (0.443) (0.365)
Mean estimate (2c) 0.406 0.312 0.430 0.387 0.346 0.421 0.353
(Lower bound estimate) (0.397) (0.305) (0.420) (0.370) (0.341) (0.399) (0.341)
Share =((1)-(2c))/(1) 0.354 0.514 0.459 0.468 0.513 0.442 0.392
Table 7. Effects of equalizing circumstances on inequality. Simulation results.
Theil coefficient for 5-year cohorts of women.  44
Figure 1. Inequality Decomposition into Opportunity and Residual Components.
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a) Partial and complete effect shown respectively on intermediate and  bottom curves. Dotted lines correspond to 
upper and lower bounds.
Figure 2. Inequality Decomposition into Opportunity and Residual 
Components.






























a) Partial and complete effect shown respectively on intermediate and  bottom curves. 
Dotted lines correspond to upper and lower bounds.
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  Figure 3: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 



























Actual Inequality Equalizing  race
Equalizing  region Equalizing  parental education
Lower-bounding of parental education at 6 years of schooling Equalizing  father's occupation
Figure 4: Complete effect of equalizing individual circumstance variables on 






























Actual Inequality Equalizing  race
Equalizing  region Equalizing  parental education
Lower-bounding of parental education at 6 years of schooling Equalizing  father's occupation